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I. INTRODUCTION
If arbitration is to remain a viable and desirable alternative to litigation,
legislatures and the American Arbitration Association must address the role
of punitive damages in commercial arbitration. Courts and commentators
alike are divided in their approach to this issue, and this lack of uniformity
recently reared its head. A recent Massachusetts Superior Court decision,
Total Property Services of New England v. Lockwood-McKinnon Co., Inc.,'
held that an arbitrator could not award punitive damages and reversed the
award. This result highlights the ongoing debate about the propriety and
desirability of punitive damages in arbitration. Although this decision was
extremely narrow, the case provides an excellent vehicle for exploring the
merits of arguments on both sides of the issue. This Article first analyzes
Total Property and argues that under Massachusetts law, the court's holding
was incorrect. Second, after reviewing the principal cases and articles
dealing with punitive damages in arbitration, this Article argues that those
addressing this area in the past failed to adequately consider both sides of
the issue. Finally, this Article suggests a compromise that would resolve
some of the complex, competing considerations on both sides and calls upon
the American Arbitration Association to implement it.
II. TOTAL PROPERTY: THE CASE
During the construction of a number of restaurants in Massachusetts,
several disputes arose between the general contractor and the owners.2
Pursuant to a standard American Arbitration Association (AAA) clause, the
parties submitted their claims to arbitration.3 The arbitrator awarded
*Associate, Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Hellman. B.A., 1987, J.D., 1993, Boston
University. In 1993, this article was awarded first prize in the CPR Excellence in Alternative
Dispute Resolution Program.
1 No. 91-949, slip op. (Sup. CL Mass. Feb. 27, 1992).
2 Id. at 2. There are few reported facts as the original proceeding was heard before an
arbitrator.
3 Id. The standard clause provides: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this contract, or breach therof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Association (AAA), and judgment upon the award rendered
by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." AAA
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RuLEs as amended and in effect, 1/1/91.
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multiple damages and attorneys' fees against the general contractor, and the
general contractor appealed.4 Despite the traditional statutorily-mandated
narrow scope of review for arbitration awards, 5 the judge vacated the award
on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by awarding
multiple damages.6
A. Holding and Analysis
Because Massachusetts only allows the award of multiple or punitive
damages pursuant to a statute,7 the court looked at Chapter 93A, of the
Consumer Protection Act and assumed that the arbitrator's award was based
on the multiple damage and attorneys' fee provisions of that statute. 8 The
court looked at a specific clause in 93A which provides that "the amount of
actual damages to be multiplied by the court shall be the amount of the
judgment on all claims arising out of the same or underlying transaction or
occurrence.. .. "9 The court held that an arbitrator's award did not
constitute a "judgment" within the meaning of 93A, and thus multiple
4 Total Property, No. 91-949, slip op. at 2.
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id. at 5-6. Awarding attorneys' fees in arbitration violates MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. Ch.
251, §10 (1992), the Massachusetts Uniform Arbitration Act.
7 See, e.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (1975).
8 Total Property, No. 91-949, slip op. at 5. See generally MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
93A (1994) (demonstrating that, since 1969, 93A, the Consumer Protection Act, is effectively
Massachusetts' most powerful general business statute); G. Richard Shell, The Power to
Punish: The Authority of Arbitrators to Award Multiple Damages and Attorney's Fees, 1987
MASS. L. REv. 26, 27 (1987) [hereinafter Shell, Power to Punish] (arguing that a defendant's
liability for multiple damages is tied to the degree of his culpability); International Fidelity
Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308, 1316 (Mass. 1983) (showing that the multiple damage
provisions of 93A are clearly punitive in nature and stating that the statute's twin goals are the
deterrence of unfair or deceptive conduct and the discouragement of vindictive lawsuits;
although 93A is consumer oriented, section 11 makes it applicable in a commercial and
business context); Joanne M. D'Alcomo, Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Arbitration
Clauses and Claims Under Unfair and Deceptive Practices Acts, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 377 (1984)
(tracing consumer protection or unfair and deceptive practices (UDAP) statutes adopted by
most states in the 1960s and 1970s and asserting that a common feature of these statutes is that
they often provide for attorney's fees and multiple or punitive damages).
9 Total Property, No. 91-949 at 6 (citing MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 9 (1994)
(empahsis added)). In normal litigation, the judge or jury would establish the amount of actual
damages as a matter of fact, and the judge would double or treble the amount, in proportion to
the nature of the unfair or deceptive conduct.
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damages were precluded. 10
Although the court noted that punitive damages are routinely awarded
by arbitrators and confirmed by courts under the Federal Arbitration Act, it
stated that Massachusetts law, under 93A, mandated a contrary result.1 The
court mentioned that it was "not unmindful of the potential 'chilling effect'
this decision may have on commercial arbitration, especially in light of
strong public policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution." 12 The court simply concluded that "the parties will have to
trade off expediency [of arbitration] for multiple damages."13 Taken one
step further, this holding indicates that by including an arbitration clause in
a contract, plaintiffs effectively waive recovery of, and defendants shield
themselves from, punitive damages under Chapter 93A.
The court suggested that amending 93A by changing the language to
"judgment or arbitrator's award" would change this result. Although this
legislative change would remedy the statutory conflict discovered by the
court, it avoids the underlying issue. The holding was obviously quite
narrow. The court chose to focus on, or create, a statutory construction
question instead of focusing on the primary conflict - the appropriateness
of awarding punitive damages in arbitration. Regardless of the narrow
holding, the case arguably conflicts with Massachusetts' precedent.
B. Waivers of 93A and Arbitration: Total Property May Be Wrong
There are two arguments that indicate that Total Property was not
properly decided. First, based on the Total Property result, anyone who
signs a contract containing an arbitration clause and later submits the
dispute to arbitration in fact waives the possibility of punitive damages
under Chapter 93A. 14 This is contrary to prior Massachusetts law. Second,
the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the issue of arbitration of claims
involving Chapter 93A and seemed to hold that these disputes are arbitrable.
In Canal Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co. 15 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the question of whether a party
could waive the right to a 93A claim. The court stated that a statutory right
may not be disclaimed if "the... waiver would do violence to the public
10 Total Propeny, No. 91-949 at 6.
11d
12 Id. at 6 n.5.
13 Id.
14 It. ("[1mt appears parties will have to trade off [the] expediency [of arbitration] for
multiple damages [under 93A].").
15 Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Mass. 1990).
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policy underlying the legislative enactment."16 The court held that where
the waiver was a purely private transaction between business parties, and
the 93A claim was merely duplicative of a claim in contract, it was not
against public policy to sustain the waiver.17 In Total Property, although the
facts are unknown, the arbitral award of multiple damages indicates the
presence of tortious conduct as well as breach of contract. Under the Total
Property holding, arbitration clauses effectively waive 93A claims. This
conflicts with the Canal Electric rule that 93A claims are generally not
waivable. The court's pronouncement in Total Property that parties in
arbitration must forgo multiple damage claims, is thus contrary to
precedent.18
In another case, Greenleaf Engineering & Construction v. Teradyne,
Inc.,19 the Massachusetts Appeals Court considered an appeal from an order
staying litigation of a 93A claim until the completion of arbitration. The
court held that where private parties agree to arbitrate a dispute that is
private in nature, litigation involving 93A can be stayed pending
arbitration.20 In other words, private commercial disputes that involve 93A
claims could arguably be arbitrated. Although the Greenleaf court did not
directly address the arbitrability of the 93A claim, other cases allowing
punitive damage issues to go to arbitration cite Greenleaf for this
proposition. 21 The Total Property court did not cite Greenleaf.
Thus, under Canal Electric, 93A claims are generally not waivable, and
under Greenleaf these claims are arbitrable. Although the result in Total
Property may be technically correct under strict statutory interpretation, it is
not supported by precedent.
C. Conclusion
The Total Property opinion avoided an in-depth analysis of the
propriety of punitive damages in arbitration. This is not surprising in light
of the lack of consensus on the issue. Federal courts generally approve of
allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages, while some state courts do
not. Either way, the Total Property holding effectively emasculates the
16 Canal Electric, 548 N.E.2d at 188 (quoting Spence v. Reeder, 416 N.E.2d 914, 924
(Mass. 1981)).
17 Canal Electric, 548 N.E.2d at 188.
18 Total Property, No. 91-949, slip op. at 6 n.5.
19 447 N.E.2d 9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
2 0 Id. at 12.
21 See Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726, 732 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Greenleaf as a case that "declined to exclude similar [punitive damage] claims from
arbitration."). See infra note 63 and accompanying text for an extensive analysis of Rodgers.
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goals of two statutes. First, in any Massachusetts contract action, plaintiffs
who sign a contract containing an arbitration clause will be unable or less
likely to pursue a punitive remedy, even in the face of clearly fraudulent
conduct. As a consequence, the deterrent effect of Chapter 93A is
minimized. In addition, by offering or signing a contract that contains an
arbitration clause, a potential defendant frees himself to act in an "unfair or
deceptive" manner without the fear of a multiple damage or attorney fee
award. Second, the effectiveness of arbitration as a realistic alternative to
litigation is infringed. Aggrieved consumers or plaintiffs must now turn to
litigation if they wish to pursue a Chapter 93A remedy, unless, of course,
they are bound by an arbitration clause.
Although much has been written on the subject, in the light of the
narrow and confused holding of Total Property, the punitive damages issue
merits further review. In the following sections, this Article will present a
background to arbitration, approaches to both sides of the issue, critiques of
those approaches, and finally, a suggested solution that may satisfy
everyone.
Hm. BACKGROUND TO ARBITRATION
A. Arbitration: Definitions, History, and Advantages
The most popular definition of arbitration is that it "is a process
whereby parties voluntarily submit their disputes for resolution by one or
more impartial third persons, not by a judicial tribunal provided by law." 22
Arbitration is not a recent innovation and has been an alternative to litigati-
on for several hundred years.23 In the United States, as early as 1855, the
Supreme Court addressed arbitration's origins in freedom of choice and the
advantages of its finality.24 In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal
2 2 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 425 n.1
(1988) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Rethinking] (citing MARTIN DOMK, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION §1.01, at 1 (G. Wlner ed. 1984)).
2 3 STEPHEN GOLDBERG ETAL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 199 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that
arbitration was used before the fourteenth century and clearly predated the American
Revolution).
24 As a mode of settling disputes, [arbitration] should receive every encouragement from
courts of equity. If the award is within the submission. ... contains the honest decision of
the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing... a court of equity will not set it aside for
error, either in law or in fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment
of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award
the commencement, not the end, of litigation.
Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
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Arbitration Act, 25 and in recent years, the Supreme Court has continued the
expansion of arbitration's scope by liberally construing arbitration clauses. 26
Under the Federal Arbitration Act and the individual states' Uniform
Arbitration Acts, arbitration is a viable and legislatively recognized
alternative to litigation.
Arbitration's many advantages over litigation include the expertise of
the decisionmaker, the finality of the decision, the privacy of the
proceedings, the procedural informality, and the low cost and speed of the
process.27 Thus, arbitration avoids many of the shortcomings of the
American judicial process. As one author notes:
The modem judicial process is characterized by high cost, excessive
formality, and long delays. Having gone to the time and trouble of
bringing a case through interminable pretrial motion practice, attempting
to educate the decision maker while observing the intricacies of the trial
procedure, and waiting out a lengthy appeal, even a 'victorious' litigant
may well question whether justice has been served.28
The benefits of arbitration are thus well recognized and receive both judicial
and legislative encouragement.
B. The Uniform and Federal Arbitration Acts
Most states enacted some version of the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA).29 The Act legislatively validates contractual arbitration clauses and
clearly defines the relationship between the arbitration process and the
judiciary. 30 Among other things, the statute provides for court confirmation
25 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (West 1970).
26 Douglas Davis, Note, Overextension of Arbitral Authority: Punitive Damages and
Issues of Arbitrabiliry-Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, 65 WASH. L. Rv.
695, 698 (1990); see also Stipanowich, Rethinking, supra note 22, at 426.
27 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 200; Stipanowich, Rethinking, supra note 22, at
433; Margaret Sullivan, Comment, The Scope of Modern Arbiral Awards, 62 TUL. L. REV.
1113, 1114 (1988).
28 Stipanowich, Rethinking, supra note 22, at 428.
29 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 251 (1992). This version, similar to that in
other states, has been in effect since 1960.
30 Id. Stating that "a written agreement" to submit to arbitration is "valid, enforceable
and irrevocable," except on other grounds for contract revocation (§ 1); provides for the fees
and expenses of arbitration (§ 10); grants due process guarantees, including "the right to be
heard, to present evidence... and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing"(§
5(a)); and provides the right to be represented by an attorney (§ 6).
46
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of the arbitration award and the extremely limited grounds for its reversal or
modification. 31 The grounds for reversal are limited to situations where the
award was "procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means," where
there was evident partiality by the arbitrator or where the arbitrator
exceeded his powers.3 2 A court will modify the award only if there was an
evident miscalculation or misidentification, the arbitrator exceeded his
authority, and changing the award would not affect the merits of the rest of
the decision.3 3 Courts generally turn to the section regarding arbitral
authority when addressing punitive damage issues.
On the federal level, there is the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)34
which governs interstate, foreign and maritime commerce, and is
enforceable in both state and federal courts. A state court enforcing an
agreement or arbitration award under the FAA must apply federal
substantive arbitration law,35 notwithstanding state law to the contrary.3 6
The federal approach to arbitration is extremely broad, and most questions,
including the award of punitive damages, are resolved in favor of expanding
the scope of arbitration and arbitral power. 37
C. Perceived Disadvantages
The perceived disadvantages of arbitration, considered in greater detail
in the second part of this Article, are mainly procedural in nature.
Arbitrators are not required to make any written findings, and can simply
award a lump sum. Further, although arbitrators may consider substantive
law, mistakes of law are generally not grounds for reversal. Mistakes of fact
are also not grounds for review. The rules of evidence do not apply, nor do
the rules of procedure or discovery. Although the arbitrator may subpoena
witnesses, generally the parties cannot. It is through these stringent
limitations on review and procedure that arbitration achieves its goals of
efficiency and finality. As we will see, these same limitations raise serious
31 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 11-13 (1992).
32 Id. § 12.
33 Id. § 13.
34 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15.
35 Shell, Power to Punish, supra note 8, at 26 n.3. A recent Supreme Court decision
"created a body of federal substantive law applicable to any agreement within the coverage of
the FAA." Davis, supra note 26, at 698 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
35 Stipanowich, Rethinng, supra note 22, at 427 n.3 (citations omitted).
37 Davis, supra note 26, at 699. There is, however, some evidence of a split in authority
regarding punitive damages in some types of arbitration, but it is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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difficulties with the award of punitive damages in arbitration.
D. Conclusion
Given the legislative and judicial support of arbitration, and the
expensive and time-consuming alternative of litigation, it is not surprising
that arbitration has increased over 250% from 1972 through 1986.38 The
strong policy favoring arbitration insulates most awards from review or
modification with the notable exception of punitive damage awards in
arbitration. Armed with the example of Total Property and the background
information on arbitration, this Article now turns to the cases and comments
on punitive damage awards in arbitration. The American judiciary and its
scholars are equally divided on the issue. This Article will first explore
some of the cases and commentaries which argue that arbitrators should be
allowed to award punitive damages and then discuss those that argue that
arbitrators should not.
IV. IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION
A. Raytheon39 and the Federal Arbitration Act
In Raytheon v. Automated Business Systems, 40 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed an arbitrator's award of punitive damages. 41 On appeal,
Raytheon raised several arguments. 42 Most relevant here is the central issue,
38 Ira Rothken, Comment, Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration: A Due Process
Analysis, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 387 n.1 (1991). For an analysis of the current state of
arbitration, see generally Stipanowich, Rethinking, supra note 22.
39 Raytheon v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
40 Id. A panel of arbitrators awarded compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and
$250,000 in punitive damages.
41 Id. The District Court affirmed the entire award. On appeal, Raytheon sought to
vacate only the punitive portion.
42 Id. Raytheon argued that the arbitrators made no findings of fact. The court stated
that arbitrators are not required to make findings of fact. Id. at 8 (citations omitted). The court
noted that arbitrators can just award a lump sum "without disclosing their rationale for it."
Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 8 (citations omitted). In addition, Raytheon argued that it was deprived
of its Fifth Amendment due process rights because the arbitrators failed to notify Raytheon
that they intended to address the issue of punitive damages. Id. The court dismissed these
arguments on two grounds. First, this argument was not supported by relevant events:
Raytheon had waited until the day the hearings started before raising the issue of punitive
damages and "buried its one sentence treatment of the issue in a 34-page memorandum." Id.
The court also stated that this argument was not supported by precedent; it distinguished the
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"whether the arbitration clause in the contract... empowered the arbitral
panel to award punitive damages." 43
Sustaining the award, the court noted the FAA's broad policies, the
breadth of the standard AAA contract clause, and the rule empowering
arbitrators to "grant any remedy or relief which is just and equitable and
within the terms of the agreement of the parties." 44 Also relevant to the
court's decision was Raytheon's commercial sophistication and probable
familiarity with the arbitration rules.45 Raytheon cited two labor arbitration
cases, including a First Circuit decision, where the court denied arbitrators
the power to award punitive damages.46 The court distinguished the two
labor cases on the grounds that "[l1abor arbitration is an integral aspect of
the entire collection of the bargaining process; it is intended to be a part of a
continuing and ameliorating enterprise between parties who maintain an
ongoing working relationship. " 47 The court concluded that commercial
arbitration, on the other hand, is normally seen as a "one-shot endeavor. " 41
The court then discussed ind rejected two possible approaches to the issue
of punitive damages in arbitration. The court declined to follow a rule of
prohibiting punitive damages in arbitration, describing it as too
restrictive. 49 The court also rejected an approach followed by some courts
which allows punitive damages to be "awarded by a' commercial arbitrator
only if the parties' agreement to arbitrate specifically provide[s] for [that]
possibility."sO The Raytheon court characterized this approach as
"inconsistent with federal arbitration policy" and contrary to the weight of
cases on which Raytheon relied as situations where the arbitrators were determined to be
completely unfair. Id. at 9. See Due Process discussion, infra note 107 and accompanying
text.
43 Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 9.
44 Id. at 10 n.4 (referring to AAA Rule 42).
45 Id. at 9. This commercial sophistication clearly did not prepare Raytheon for the
award of punitive damages. The AAA rules do not mention punitive damages, although, as
will be argued at the end of this Note, they should. For a thorough criticism, see Davis, supra
note 26.
4 6 Bacardi Corp. v. Congreso de Uniones Industriales de Puerto Rico, 692 F.2d 210,
214 (1st Cir. 1982) (requiring authorization for an arbitrator to award punitive damages);
Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1164 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
47 Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 10.
48 Id.
49 Id at 11. For an extensive discussion of this approach in the discussion of the Garrity
decision, see infra text part V.A.
5 0 Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11. The court cited Belko v. AVX Corp., 251 Cal. Rptr. 557,
562 (1988) for this proposition. The Raytheon court argued that it went against prior
California precedent.
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federal authority.51 The Raytheon court chose to follow other federal
circuits and held that arbitrators could award punitive damages. The
Raytheon court, looking at the plaintiff's rights, concluded that "the fact
that the parties agreed to resolve their dispute through an expedited and less
formal procedure does not mean that they should... surrender a legitimate
claim to damages." 52 The court also noted that parties wishing to exclude
punitive damage awards from arbitration could do so by contract. 53
Thus, the First Circuit chose a fairly "inclusive" approach to the
arbitration clause - unless otherwise specified, punitive damages are within
the scope of arbitration. This gives the benefit of the clause to the party
seeking to recover punitive damages. Although this position upholds public
policies favoring punitive damages, it raises serious due process questions,
which are discussed later.
B. Approach: Punitive Damages Are of Social Importance
In his article, Richard Shell presents some of the arguments that support
punitive damages in general. 54 These include compensating plaintiffs for
legal costs, injured feelings, insult, and mental distress, punishing
defendants "for injuries to society caused by flagrant abuse of accepted
norms," and deterring potential wrongdoers.55 Shell believes that the
inherent value of these rationales justifies the award of punitive damages in
arbitration.
One could argue, however, that because arbitrators issue no findings,
the deterrence-of-potential-wrongdoers argument must fail. Until such time
as arbitrator awards become part of the public record, the deterrent effect is
certainly minimal. Shell addresses this difficulty by arguing that "it is
possible that third parties in the defendant's industry will learn that a
particular award has been made by word-of-mouth, through the trade press,
or through published opinions resulting from judicial proceedings to vacate
51 Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11.
52 Id. at 12.
53 Id.
54 Shell, Power to Punish, supra note 8. He argues that arbitrators should be permitted
to award damages under 93A. The article was written before the Total Property decision.
5 5 Id. at 29 (quoting David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions,
55 IowA L. Rnv. 307, 309 (1969)). Another argument is that "punitive damages provide an
incentive... to pursue causes of action where tangible harm and resulting damages are
nominal but where the defendant's behavior subjects society to substantial risks." Thomas
Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart Inc. Reconsidered, 66
B.U. L. REv. 953 (1986) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Stipanowich, Punitive Damages].
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or confirm the award." 56 This response is weak and detracts from his
central premise. To be an effective deterrent, the punishment must be
disseminated to as many defendants as possible. At the very least, attorneys
should know that an award of punitive damages has been made. Since most
arbitration awards go unpublished, the deterrent effect is practically
nonexistent.
Shell argues that a rule barring multiple damage awards by arbitrators
poses a danger to the arbitration system as a whole. 57 He points out that one
of the UAA's strengths is its emphasis upon flexible remedial authority, and
if punitive damages are barred, the arbitration forum could lose a measure
of this flexibility.58 Further, parties might be less likely to choose to invoke
arbitration if they know that they will forgo important statutory remedies. 59
Shell and others who support his position fail to address this issue from
the defendant's perspective. Most defendants would not want the issue of
punitive damages presented to an arbitrator who is not bound by substantive
law, who is not required to prepare written findings, and from whose
decision there is little room to appeal. There must be some protection
offered to the defendant faced with large punitive damage awards.
Finally, Shell argues that most Unfair and Deceptive Practices (UDAP)
statutes, like Chapter 93A, require the doubling or trebling of damages
depending on the facts. Therefore, the damages are not arbitrarily punitive
and are limited to a factor of the actual damages. 60 Further, he posits that
courts will scrutinize multiple or punitive arbitration awards more closely
than they would ordinary awards.61 He notes that although this may hurt the
finality aspect of arbitration, he believes that "[tihis marginal degree of
increased scrutiny by the judiciary... is not likely to cause major
inefficiencies in the arbitration process as a whole." 62 This approach does,
however, involve greater judicial meddling in the arbitration process, with
its related increase in both time and expense.
Raytheon, decided two years after Shell's article, indicates that courts
give little scrutiny to the award. The Raytheon court paid little or no
attention to the content of and basis for the punitive damage award.
Although some of Shell's arguments based on the beneficial aspects of
punitive damages are persuasive, the lack of attention to the defendants'
56 Shell, Power to Punish, supra note 8, at 34.
57 1d. at 33.
5 8 id.
59 Id.
60 Id. Shell fails to address the legal rule that arbitrators need not delineate the basis of
the award, nor are they constrained by substantive law. Therefore, a court may not know the
basis for computing the award, as in Total Property.
61 Shell, Power to Punish, supra note 8, at 35.Id. at 35.
62 1d. at 34.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
perspective undermines their validity. Arbitration is designed to benefit
both parties, not just an aggrieved plaintiff.
C. The Rodgers63 Case: Minimizing Exceptions to Arbitration's
Reviewability Can Also Hurt the Plaintiff
In Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, a North Carolina court held that
an arbitrator can award punitive damages.64 The plaintiff had filed a
complaint, but the action was stayed pending arbitration. 65 After
confirmation of the award, the plaintiff amended his court complaint to
include fraud claims and $1 million in punitive damages. 66 The appeals
court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the
amended claims were barred by the doctrine of resjudicata.67 The plaintiff
argued that because the punitive damage claims were outside the scope of
the arbitration agreement, res judicata did not apply68. The appeals court,
emphasizing the strength of state policy favoring arbitration, held that all
the claims, including those for punitive damages, were sufficiently related
to the original contract to be arbitrable. 69 The plaintiff was thus effectively
precluded from recovering punitive damages.
In a Comment on Rodgers, one author argues that courts essentially
balance the imperativeness of the punitive damages policy against the
advantages of arbitration. 70 Noting various exceptions to the rule against
punitive damages and reviewability, the author argues that the public policy
considerations that support exceptions to the arbitrability of punitive
damages in areas such as collective bargaining, antitrust, child custody or
support, do not apply in the commercial contract context. 71 The primary
63 Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
64 Id. at 734.
65 Id. at 728.
66 Id. at 729-30.
6 7 Id. at 730. For a discussion of res judicata and arbitration, see generally Hiroshi
Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to Shape Procedural
Choices, 63 TUL. L. Rnv. 29 (1988); G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623 (1988).
68 Rodgers, 331 S.E.2d at 731.
69 Id. at 730-34.
7 0 Mitchell Benowitz, Comment, Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen: Arbitration and
Punitive Damages, 64 N.C. L. Ru-v. 1145, 1149 (1986) (citations omitted). This is an
extremely persuasive argument for the notion that this area of the law - defining the scope of
arbitration - has been and should continue to be a legislative finction, not a judicial one.
71 Id. at 1149-53.
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reason for these exceptions "is that a private resolution of the dispute may
adversely affect nonparticipating third parties, whose interests the courts
must protect. "72 These parties include the public in antitrust cases or
individuals in child custody disputes.73 Commercial disputes, he argues,
raise no such concerns, as the parties are on equal footing.
Although the Rodgers case involved a plaintiff's lost rights, the
author's approach again neglects the defendant who has almost no recourse
to the courts for correction of an overly large punitive damages award. The
author notes that common arguments against punitive damages are the
potential for abuse by arbitrators and the lack of a trial's procedural
safeguards. 74 He argues that the premise that a punitive damage award may
reflect prejudice rather than impartial judgment is equally applicable to a
jury award. 75 He neglects to mention that in a jury trial, unlike in
arbitration, the potential for prejudice, is neatly counterbalanced by its
appealability. 76
The Comment raises a number of other arguments in favor of allowing
punitive damages in arbitration. First, in contrast to a trial court's relative
inexperience, an arbitrator's expertise in a particular business enables her to
determine whether certain commercial conduct warrants a punitive
remedy. 77 Second, not allowing an arbitrator to award punitive damages
creates the practical problem of having a separate trial for punitive damages
while infringing on the arbitrator's discretion to fashioi remedies. 78 Third,
the threat of punitive damages would provide an effective means for an
arbitrator to force compliance with any other remedy fashioned by the
arbitrator. 79 In sum, the author concludes that the public policy favoring
arbitration outweighs the difficulties of allowing punitive damages.80
72 Bmawitz, supra note 70, at 1149.
7 3 Id. (citations omitted).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1152-53 (citations omitted).
76 In addition, at least under 93A, it is the judge awarding punitive damages. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §11 (1994).
7 7 Benowitz, supra note 70, at 1153 (citation omitted). Why is a construction expert
better than a court to determine if fraud or an unfair or deceptive act occurred? The standards
for proving fraud or unfair or deceptive acts should not be unique to a specific industry. To
create such a broad range of "standards" would grant arbitrators broad power and give parties
so little guidance that the deterrent effect of punitive damages would be minimized.
78 Id. (citation omitted).
79 d.
80 Id. at 1156.
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D. Freedom to Contract and Arbitral Flexibility
Another author s' argues that maintaining an arbitrator's flexibility in
fashioning remedies is the principal policy reason for allowing punitive
damages in arbitration. 82 He states that the legislative decision to grant
arbitrators considerable latitude and flexibility in fashioning remedies
parallels the placement of limitations on judicial review of arbitrators'
awards. 83 Ie further argues that judicial and legislative precedent militate
against placing limits on the scope of arbitral authority. 84
Another argument he raises is based on the freedom to contract. This
parallel development, of latitude for arbitrators and narrow review for
courts, is "consistent with the belief that by providing for arbitration,
parties have voluntarily chosen a [final and binding] system of dispute
resolution."85 Further, the policy of allowing parties to choose their own
forum originates in freedom to contract principles that cannot be disturbed
by the courts. 86 The counterargument to this justification is fairly obvious,
and is the principal thread running through all of these cases. It is
inequitable to include in this binding agreement something a party did not
consider - the possibility of paying or giving up the right to punitive
damages.
E. Conclusion: Flaws in the Above Arguments
The courts and authors consistently avoid addressing rights of both the
plaintiffs and defendants. Forcing defendants to pay punitive damages
awards when they have not agreed to arbitrate the issue or forcing plaintiffs
to forgo their punitive damage claims clearly advance some of the principal
goals of arbitration - speed, efficiency, and low cost. But at what price?
These courts fail to sustain arbitration as a legitimate and complete
alternative to litigation. Raytheon, for example, would certainly have
preferred a trial on the punitive damage issue, thus gaining some of
litigation's judicial safeguards. Further, arbitration is part of a contractual
agreement, which by definition, represents two parties attempting to finalize
81 See Stipanowich, Punitive Damages, supra note 55. This article is primarily a critique
of the famous Garrity case, discussed infra text part V.A., that held that punitive damages are
never awardable in arbitration.
82 Stipanowich, Punitive Damages, supra note 55, at 981-82.
83 Id. at 978.
4 Id. at 982.
85 Id. at 982-83 (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 989 (quoting Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 389 N.E.2d 456, 459 (N.Y. 1979)).
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their mutual understanding. It is thus inequitable to require parties to
arbitrate something they either did not consider or specifically desired not to
arbitrate. Finally, none of the above arguments address the fact that punitive
damages in the commercial context can be viewed as a windfall. It seems
unfair to require a commercial defendant to pay these sums without judicial
protections. With these criticisms in mind, this Article turns to the other
authors and cases that would not allow punitive damages in arbitration.
V. AGAINST ALLOWING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION
A. The Leading Case: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.:87 Societal Norms
Mandate That Only Courts Can Punish
The Ganrity decision has been discussed, analyzed and critiqued
extensively. 88 It does, however, present some of the more persuasive
reasons for not allowing arbitrators to reach the issue of punitive damages.
In Garity, the New York Court of Appeals held that enforcing a punitive
damages award as a purely private remedy violated public policy and
vacated an arbitrator's award of punitive damages. 89 Judge Breitel cited a
number of principles in support of his holding.
First, "[flt has always been held that punitive damages are not available
for mere breach of contract for in such a case only a private wrong, and not
a public right, is involved." 90 Contract law generally forbids the award of
punitive damages in actions for breach; because arbitration:is a contractual
remedy, there is no place for punitive damages. 91
Second, Judge Breitel wrote, even if the breach were sufficiently
egregious to warrant punitive damages, "it was not the province of the
arbitrators to do so. Punitive damages are reserved to the state, surely a
87 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
88 See, e.g., Stipanowich, Punitive Damages, supra note 55; Shell, Power to Punish,
supra note 8.
89 Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 795. One of the primary criticisms of this holding is Judge
Breitel's lack of support for these public policy statements. See Stipanowich, Punitive
Damages, supra note 55, at 961. Breitel stated that this holding applies even if the parties
agreed to submit the punitive damage issues. This statement went beyond the scope of the
case before the court. "The parties never agreed, or for that matter, even considered punitive
damages." Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 797.
90 Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 795 (citations omitted). See also United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (disallowing a punitive damages
award in arbitration "because parties may not contract to benefit from or be penalized by
punitive damages").
91 Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794.
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public policy 'of such magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion.'"92 The
judge had several concerns with arbitrators invading the province of the
state. He believed that arbitrators, unconstrained by substantive law, could
render completely arbitrary punitive damages awards. 93 Breitel further
argues:
In imposing penal sanctions in private arrangements, a tradition of the rule
of law in organized society is violated. One purpose [of the rule] ... is to
require that the use of coercion be controlled by the State.... The day is
long past since barbaric man achieved redress by private punitive
measures.94
Thus, Breitel argues, the freedom to contract does not include the freedom
to punish. 95 This last assertion is questionable. No one would argue that all
out-of-court settlements are purely compensatory. These settlements,
accompanied by contract documents and disclaimers, are arguably private
punishment, and receive even greater support as an alternative to litigation
than does arbitration.
The Garrity opinion, while colorful, is the subject of much criticism.
Judge Breitel did, however, address a legitimate concern: in the rush to
expand the scope of arbitration, the rights of the defendant are often
trampled. 96
B. Criticizing Punitive Damages Generally and in Arbitration
Punitive damages are often criticized generally on a number of grounds.
One of the strongest complaints is that punitive damages are a form of civil
punishment. 97 Opponents of punitive damages argue that allowing
punishment in a civil context, with its absence of the procedural safeguards
found in a criminal trial, is a violation of due process. 98 Further, "the
possibility of multiple jury awards against a single defendant...
exacerbates the potential for the deprivation of property without due process
92 Ganity, 353 N.E.2d at 796 (citations omitted). This argument is seen in the due
process discussion, infra text parts V.B-C.
93 d. (stating that this "would lead to a Shylock principle of doing business without a
Portia-like escape from the vise of a logic foreign to arbitration law.").
94 Id. at 796-97.
95 Id. at 797.
96 See the due process arguments, infra text part V.C.
97 Margaret P. Sullivan, Comment, The Scope of Modem Arbitral Awards, 62 TUL. L.
Rev. 1113, 1125 (1988).
98.Id. at 1125.
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of law and raises the possibility of a double jeopardy violation." 99 Although
the latter is less of a concern between business parties, the former is
certainly relevant, given the limited procedural safeguards of arbitration.
Another general concern about punitive damages is the lower burden of
proof in civil trials which distributes the possibility of error equally between
the parties.100 While this risk allocation is acceptable in a determination of
compensatory damages, it is certainly more onerous when punitive damages
are awarded. This too is exacerbated in arbitration because burdens of proof
and other procedural safeguards are nonexistent. 0 1 One commentator notes
that punitive damages in arbitration would eliminate one of arbitration's
most attractive advantages. 102 As mentioned above, the growth of punitive
damage awards by arbitrators will tend to invite greater judicial review. 103
Further, many parties that litigate are often involved in repeat transactions.
Arbitration, with its less adversarial atmosphere, arguably helps enhance
and protect these relationships. Punitive damages could encroach on this
positive aspect. 104 Finally, if the procedural safeguards found in criminal or
civil trials are instituted in an arbitration proceeding, the "resulting
proceeding would be virtually indistinguishable from its litigation
counterpart." 105 Thus, it would seem preferable to eliminate punitive
damages from arbitration entirely. This solution, however, fails to address
the rights of the aggrieved plaintiff. Any public policy bar to punitive
damages in arbitration leaves a plaintiff without recourse to this remedy
under resjudicata principles. 10 6
99 Sullivan, supra note 97, at 1125.
0 0 Id. at 1125-26.
10 1 Id. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of large punitive
damage awards repeatedly in the last several years and is concerned with the broad discretion
found in jury trials. Although often sustaining the awards, the procedural safeguards the
courts look to are clearly absent from arbitration. See, e.g., Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1990). The Supreme Court recently returned to this issue in TXO
Production Corp., v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2711 (1993). In multiple opinions
the Court held against a due process challenge to a $10 million punitive damage award, where
compensatory damages totaled only $19,000. One factor relevant to the decision was that "the
notice component of the Due Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly indicated that a
punitive damages award might be imposed in response to egregiously tortious conduct. Prior
law ... unquestionably did so." Id. at 2724 (citation omitted). IXO thus illustrates the
importance of consistently notifying parties, who submit their claims to arbitration, of the
potential award of punitive damages.
102 Sullivan, supra note 97, at 1127.
103 id.
104rd,
105 Id. at 1128.
10 6 Id. at 1137. See also Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726 (N.C.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
C. Punitive Damages in Arbitration Violate Due Process
Guarantees: Solution - Require a Written Finding10 7
One author maintains, from a purely legal perspective, that punitive
damages cannot be awarded in arbitration. 08 His primary argument is that
punitive damage awards in commercial arbitration constitute state action,
thus requiring due process. 0 9 Citing Garrity, he states that unlike
traditional compensatory damages under contract, the power to award
punitive damages is exclusively that of the state.' 10
An examination of the difference between compensatory and punitive
damages is illustrative. Generally, claims for compensatory damages result
from an interaction between autonomous parties gone awry."' These
claims, because they are based on purely personal interaction, are removable
from judicial administration. Punitive damages, however, use the breaching
party's liability as a means of achieving the social goal of deterrence and
punishment." 2 The availability of these damages has arguably been grafted
onto the contractual relationship by the legislature or judiciary. 113 This
distinction, taken one step further, leads to the conclusion that punitive
damages must be imposed by the state, as it is outside of the parties'
relationship. 1 4 Thus, the award of punitive damages is a state function.
The next stage in the author's analysis involves examining the process
by which arbitrators award these damages" 5 and applying the Supreme
Court's due process balancing test. 116 The test analyzes three factors: First,
the court examines "the private interest that will be impacted by the official
action."117 Clearly the private interest here is significant, as punitive
damages awards can be quite large and bear little relationship to the actual
damages suffered. 18 Second, the court must determine the possibility of
1985).
107 See generally Rothken, supra note 38.
108 Id. at 403-04.
109 Rothken, supra note 38, at 387.
110 Id. at 394.
211 Id. at 398.
112 Id.
113 id.
114 Rothken, supra note 38, at 398.
115 Id. (Arguing the process is one of "unfettered discretion.").
116 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The test is used to determine "the
constitutional adequacy of a particular set of procedures." Rothken, supra note 38, at 399.
117 Rothken, supra note 38, at 399.
118 This is true, except under statutes like MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A § 52
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erroneous deprivation of the private interest through these procedures and
"the probable value of enhanced procedural safeguards."11 9 Because
arbitrators are bound neither by law nor fact, even if clearly erroneous, the
possibility of error is quite high. Therefore, the probable value of
safeguards is obvious. Finally, the court must examine the governmental
interest, including the function involved and the various monetary and
administrative costs incurred by improving the procedural requirements. 120
The government clearly has no legitimate interest in erroneous punitive
damage awards, and the author argues that improving the procedural
requirements by requiring a written finding is fairly simple.
The author argues that the uncertainty and secrecy of A punitive damage
award and its related due process difficulties are easily remedied by
requiring an arbitrator to prepare a written opinion justifying a punitive
damage award, thus enabling judicial review.12 1 Further, a quick and
efficient arbitration process resulting in erroneous penalties would scare
parties away from arbitration and would lead to greater litigation, precisely
what arbitration seeks to avoid. Thus, the author concludes, as the matter
currently stands, awarding punitive damages in arbitration violates due
process.1 22 Requiring a written finding, however, would rectify this
situation.
The author fails to note that filing a written finding with any award of
punitive damages presents additional benefits. First, a written opinion
would improve the deterrent effect of punitive damage awards, especially if
reviewed and sustained by a court, because it would become part of the
public record. Second, it would give arbitrators some guidelines to follow
when awarding future putnitive damage awards. Finally, the procedure for
reviewing a master's written findings on specific issues already exists in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.123 On the other hand, requiring a written
finding raises at least two difficulties. First, establishing judicial review
involves legislative change of the standards found in the Uniform and
Federal Arbitration Acts. Second, by opening up the review of arbitration,
the parties are headed back in the direction of litigation.
(1994), where the compensatory damages are doubled or trebled. Regardless, the private
interest is still significant.
119 Rothken, supra note 38, at 399.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 401. The author fails to note that the UAA would require modification.
122 Id. at 404.
123 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 53 and MAss. R. Civ. P. 53 (dealing with the
appointment of Masters and the reviewability of their findings).
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D. Raytheon Was Wrong: Predefine Arbitral Authority
Earlier, this Article discussed some of the rationales presented by the
First Circuit in support of its decision in Raytheon.124 This section presents
a critique of that case, giving reasons why the court could have and should
have held otherwise. Courts are currently interpreting arbitration clauses to
"authorize awards of punitive, consequential, and liquidated damages, as
well as injunctions and prejudgment interest." 125 One difficulty with this
trend, and the Raytheon decision itself, is the practical issue of the parties'
lack of awareness. One author points out that because broad arbitration
clauses fail to specify that arbitrators may impose non-traditional contract
remedies, the parties may not be aware that these agreements increase their
exposure to potential liability. 126 Further, if were they are aware of their
exposure, parties may still wish to avoid arbitration because it lacks judicial
and procedural protection. These deficiencies lead to the conclusion that
contracts containing broad arbitration clauses increase potential liability and
eliminate procedural safeguards. 1 27
One author's principal argument with the specific Raytheon decision is
that the court should have required the arbitrators to predefine the scope of
their authority. 12 8 He bases this argument in contract theory. Because
arbitral authority is contractually created, the parties intent should control
interpretation of their agreement.12 9 The Raytheon contract contained a
California choice-of-law provision. Under California law arbitrators cannot
award punitive damages unless expressly authorized in the contract. 130 This
demonstrates that the parties did not intend the arbitrators to consider
punitive damages. The author argues that upon receiving Raytheon's written
objection to punitive damages, the arbitrators should have immediately
determined the scope of their authority under the contract. 1 31
The author argues that the Raytheon court's distinction between labor
arbitration, where punitive damages are not allowed, and commercial
arbitration, where they are allowed, is not a valid one, because the policies
behind punitive awards in commercial and labor arbitration are not
124 See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
125 Davis, supra note 26, at 696-97.
126 Id. at 697.
127 Id. at 698.
128 Id. at 704.
129 Id.
130 Davis, supra note 26, at 704. This is based on the holding in Belko, discussed supra
in note 50, and was distinguished by the Raytheon court.
131 Davis, supra note 26, at 705.
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contrary. 132 Further, the fundamental concern with subjecting the parties to
punitive damages remains, regardless of the duration of the parties'
relationship. 133 Thus, characterizing commercial arbitration as a "one-shot
deal" resolves nothing and avoids the issue.
Finally, the author presents three arguments in favor of either requiring
the arbitrators to predefine their authority or allowing punitive damages
only where the arbitration clause specifically grants such relief. Requiring
arbitrators to determine the scope of their authority prior to addressing
substantive issues says Davis creates two advantages. First, it prevents the
arbitrators from unauthorized expansion of their powers.lM4 This in turn
gives grounds for judicial review of the scope of this authority. 135
The second advantage in requiring the arbitrators to predefine the scope
of their authority is much more obvious. Parties, such as Raytheon, would
not be taken by surprise. Having a better idea of their exposure to liability
would encourage more informed decisionmaking about the desirability of
arbitration. 136 Further, if the issue of punitive damages is within the scope
of arbitration, both parties would be better prepared to present arguments
and evidence in their favor.137 Finally, by requiring parties to draft
specifically tailored arbitration clauses, arbitration would remain an
attractive alternative to litigation. 138
Thus, the author addresses two important issues. First, he looks at
defendants' rights, and concludes that under the current state of the law,
defendants entering arbitration often get more than they bargained for and
are left unprotected by the court. 139 Second, by arguing that arbitrators
should predefine their authority, or in the alternative, that punitive damages
be allowed only in the presence of a contractual agreement, the author
presents a solution that does not significantly detract from any of
arbitration's underlying benefits.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SOLUTIONS
Thus far, this Article has addressed the principal arguments in favor of
132 Davis, supra note 26, at 709.
133 Id. at 709-10.
134 1. at 705.
135 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 12(a)(3) (1992). (The UAA allows
judicial modification or vacation where an arbitrator ventures beyond the scope of the parties'
agreement.).
136 Davis, supra note 26, at 706.
137 Id, at 707-08.
138 i& at 711.
139 Id. at 710-11.
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and against allowing punitive damages in arbitration. Those in favor argue
that arbitration law permits minimal review, that arbitration must remain a
flexible process, that the plaintiff must retain the right to recover punitive
damages, and that significant precedent favoring arbitration prohibits
craffing any more judicial exceptions. Those against argue that awarding
punitive damages in arbitration is unfair to both parties, deprives them of
due process, hurts the desirability of arbitration, and fails to recognize or
address the parties' contractual expectations. They also argue that punitive
damages are the province of the state because they are a form of
punishment. Some of the suggestions for resolving this dispute include
legislative change of the UAA, better tailored arbitration clauses, written
findings by arbitrators on punitive damage issues, or a requirement that
arbitrators to predefine the scope of their authority.
What are the other options? One could argue that these parties are
bound by their contract. Let the courts of each state determine that state's
rule and leave the parties to their bargain. Because arbitration is a voluntary
process, this approach would certainly fail. One of arbitration's advantages
is that most states and the federal government have enacted some form of
the UAA. If each state develops a different rule on punitive damages in
arbitration, not only would parties be less likely to consider arbitration a
viable alternative, but also different rules would raise a host of conflict of
law issues. Even if each state agreed to include punitive damages in
arbitration, the due process issues are not addressed. Despite these
problems, the principal goals of arbitration are speed, efficiency, and
lessened expense. Notwithstanding current attempts to appeal arbitral
awards of punitive damages, getting the judiciary overinvolved in the
arbitration process is counterproductive. Combining the solutions presented
above would allow punitive damage awards in arbitration and would
recognize both parties' rights, while avoiding significant legislative or
judicial action.
A. Notice and Written Findings
In the absence of a clear and specific arbitration agreement between the
parties, each state or the AAA should establish the following procedure.
First, arbitrators must establish the scope of the arbitration. For example, if
the arbitrators are going to consider the issue of punitive damages, they
should at least inform the parties at the very outset. This will avoid the
patent inequity of the Raytheon result and narrow holdings like Total
Property. Second, the arbitrators could be required to make a brief written
finding of the amount of and justification for the punitive portion of the
damages award. A clear and concise statement of the unfair, deceptive,
fraudulent or other tortious conduct, and its relationship to the amount of
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damages awarded would suffice. There would be no need for evidentiary
analysis, discussions of the burden of proof, analysis of precedent, or other
legal matters. Further, if the parties agreed that this written finding is
reviewable, the UAA would not require modification.
By following these two simple procedures, arbitration could remain a
speedy and efficient alternative to litigation. In addition, it would remove a
degree of the randomness or unfairness currently found in the punitive
damages in arbitration milieu.
B. Change the Standard Arbitration Clause
In the alternative, or in addition to, the above suggestion, by modifying
the language of its standard arbitration clause, or of its rules, the AAA
could avoid the entire issue. The following could be added at the end of the
standard clause:
1. The parties DO AGREE - DO NOT AGREE (circle one)
to submit claims to the arbitrator(s) for punitive damages arising
out of the transactions that give rise to this arbitration.
2. If the parties DO NOT AGREE to submit the punitive damage
claims, they preserve their right to present these claims in a
court of law. Further, the parties agree that the arbitrator's
decision is binding only as to the amount of compensatory
damages or other nonpunitive relief awarded.
By inserting these two paragraphs, the parties either agree to submit
their punitive damage claims, thus giving both sides fair notice, or agree to
try the punitive claim in court. The second paragraph avoids the res
judicata problems that preclude the relitigation of issues common to both
the compensatory and punitive damage awards. In addition, the clause is
fair to both plaintiff and defendant. The defendant will have either notice or
a court's procedural guarantees, while the plaintiff will not be required to
forgo a potential punitive damage claim. Although this would require a
bifurcated proceeding, involving both arbitration and litigation, it is
arguable that the stakes involved in a punitive damage suit merit the extra
time and expense of waiting and preparing for a trial. It would also serve to
minimize frivolous or "secondary" punitive damage claims. If a plaintiff
felt that he had a poor case, he would not pursue the punitive damage claim
in court.
It is unclear to this author, given the current split in authority and the
vast amount of legal scholarship on the issue, why the AAA has not already
changed the standard clause. This is particularly true given that the majority
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of attorneys disapprove of punitive damages in arbitration. 140 Perhaps part
of the reason is the paradoxical nature of the problem. On one side,
everyone would like to be as fair as possible to both parties, while on the
other, they would want to avoid slowing the pace or increasing the expense
of the arbitration process. Yet, most of the suggestions offered to resolve
the tension involve doing either one or the other, because as the procedural
guarantees are strengthened, the process of arbitration becomes more
cumbersome. The modification of the standard clause, however, is arguably
a step in the right direction.
Finally, although the above solutions seem workable, significant input
is needed from the legislatures around the country. Temporary measures are
insufficient. The courts are presented with competing legislatively mandated
processes - punitive damages and arbitration. The AAA or the legislatures,
or both, must act if arbitration is to remain an attractive and viable
option.141
140 See Stipanowich, Rethinking, supra note 22, at 467 (stating that in a survey
conducted by the ABA, "[aipproximately two-thirds of the survey group [of 503 attorneys]
were opposed to amending the [AAA] Rules to expressly authorize arbitrators to award
punitive damages").
141 Id. at 485. 'If public policy . . . ultimately require[s] that arbitrators be prevented
from giving punitive damages, the answer must lie in statutory reform .....
64
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